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Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008 
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller*
Abstract
We report on a comprehensive data base of eighteen years of published opinions (1993-
2008, inclusive) on settlements in class action and shareholder derivative cases in both state and 
federal courts.  An earlier study, covering 1993-2002, revealed a remarkable relationship between 
attorneys’ fees and the size of class recovery: regardless of the methodology for calculating fees 
ostensibly employed by the courts, the overwhelmingly important determinant of the fee was 
simply the size of the recovery obtained by the class.  The present study, which nearly doubles 
the number of cases in the data base, powerfully confirms that relationship.  Fees display the 
same relationship to class recoveries in both data sets and neither fees nor recoveries materially 
increased over time.  Although the size of the class recovery dwarfs other influences, significant 
associations exist between the fee amount and both the fee method used and the riskiness of the 
case. We found no robust evidence of significant differences between federal and state courts. 
The strong association between fee and class recovery persists in cases with recoveries of $100 
million or more, as do the significant associations between fee level and fee method and risk.  
Fees were not significantly affected by the existence of a settlement class, the presence of 
objectors, or opt outs from the class.  Courts granted the requested fee in over 70% of the cases, 
with the Second Circuit granting the requested amount least often.  In cases in which the 
requested fee was not awarded, the mean fee was 68% of the requested amount.  Fees and costs 
exhibit scale effects with the percent of each decreasing as the class recovery amount increased.  
Costs are strongly associated with hours expended on the case.   
* Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law & Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, 
Cornell Law School.  Miller is Robert B. and Candace J. Haas Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School and Stuyvesant P. Comfort Professor of Law, New York University Law School.  We thank 
participants at the International Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Tel Aviv University and Kevin 
Clermont for comments and Thomas P. Eisenberg, Nicholas Germain, and Erica Miller for excellent 
research assistance.  Miller and Eisenberg have from time to time acted as an expert witness or consultant 
on the issue of attorneys’ fees in class action cases. 
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I. Introduction and Background
 Class actions and their close cousins, shareholder derivative lawsuits, are vital 
mechanisms by which the legal system copes with mass harms – similar injuries to a 
large number of people.  Long a feature of the American landscape, class actions have 
recently begun to spread across the world.1
A crucial issue for all class and derivative litigation is the matter of compensating 
counsel.  Attorneys do not work for free.  Unless class counsel are adequately 
compensated, class and derivative litigation will be undersupplied in the legal market.  
On the other hand, if class action attorneys are overcompensated they may bring too 
many of these lawsuits and receive an excessive share of the settlement value in cases 
that are brought. 
 In normal litigation the attorney’s compensation can be set by private agreement 
between lawyer and client.  But private agreement does not work in the case of class 
action and derivative litigation: in these contexts there is no client capable of negotiating 
with the attorney.  In class actions, the clients are disorganized and, prior to notice of 
certification, usually do not even know that a lawsuit has been filed on their behalf.  
Except perhaps in the case of private securities litigation, the representative plaintiff 
cannot effectively negotiate with the attorneys over the matter of fees and costs: he or she 
has only a minority stake in the matter (in consumer cases, often a miniscule one), is 
often unsophisticated, and may be strongly influenced by the attorney’s advice.  In 
derivative cases, the ostensible client – the corporation – is usually managed by 
defendants in the lawsuits and therefore is unwilling to pay any fee to incentivize an 
attorney to bring the lawsuit.  In both settings, therefore, the court must independently 
determine the appropriate attorneys’ fee award..
 Where can the court look for information on this question?  No private 
stakeholder is a reliable source of information.  The class attorneys’  suggested fee is not 
impartial since, at the time of the settlement, their interest is to seek the largest possible 
award.  Nor can the court rely on the defendant’s recommendations.  Settlement 
agreements often contain “clear sailing” clauses under which defendants agree not to 
object to a fee request up to a certain amount.  But clear sailing agreements are of little 
value when the defendant is not paying the fee – indeed, it is not clear that the defendant 
has any “skin in the game” when the fee will be paid out of the class recovery.  Even 
when the defendant does pay the fee – as in the typical consumer class action – the clear 
sailing agreement has limited probative value unless the parties have deferred fee 
negotiations until after achieving a definite agreement on the merits (otherwise there is 
reason for concern that the defendant may have agreed to pay class counsel a premium in 
exchange for reductions in the amount going to the class).  The reaction of the class to the 
settlement and proposed fee is also not a reliable guide.  Empirical research suggests that 
the vast majority of class members are rationally indifferent to class action settlements; 
their failure to opt out of a settlement does not indicate approval of the proposed fee2
Nor can the court rely on objectors to the settlement.  Few objectors appear at class action 
1 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff and Geoffrey Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 179 (2009). 
2 See Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1529 (2004). 
3fairness hearings,3 and those who show up may not object to the fee.  Even if objectors do 
complain about the fee, they have only a small amount at stake and thus lack the 
incentive to thoroughly research the fee question.. 
 Lacking reliable guidance from class counsel, the defendant, class 
members, or objectors, the judge has no alternative but to make an independent 
investigation.  Where, however, should the judge look for information pertinent to the 
task of setting fees?  Among the factors that judges typically examine in setting fees, the 
most important is probably that of “awards in similar cases.”4  Precedents of fees 
awarded by other courts should, in theory, be relatively reliable guides because the prior 
courts were presumably exercising the requisite rigorous scrutiny and judicial 
independence when they set the fees, and because class counsel will have presumably 
considered the relevant case law in calculating whether or not to take on the litigation in 
the case at bar.  But even this approach is not problem-free. In the typical class action 
settlement the fee is taken from the common fund generated on behalf of the class.  No 
party, in this case, has the right incentives to vigorously research the precedents running 
contrary to counsel’s fee request.  Unless the judge does his or her own research, he or 
she may not have access to unbiased information about fees in similar cases.   
 The present empirical study is intended to assist courts in the task of fee setting – 
and counsel in the task of identifying appropriate fees to request – by supplying an 
account of compensation practices in courts across the country, studied over an extended 
period of time, and conducted in an academic setting outside the fires of litigation. The 
information provided in this article is the best data on “awards in similar cases” from 
cases with available opinions.  If used effectively, our study may be of material assistance 
in further rationalizing the compensation of class counsel. 
 We find, regardless of the methodology for calculating fees ostensibly employed 
by the courts, the overwhelmingly important determinant of the fee was simply the size 
of the recovery obtained by the class.  Fees display the same relationship to class 
recoveries in data sets spanning both 1993 to 2002 and 2003 to 2008.  Neither fees nor 
recoveries materially increased over time.  Although the size of the class recovery dwarfs 
other influences, significant associations exist between the fee amount and both the fee 
method used and the riskiness of the case. We found no robust evidence of significant 
differences between federal and state courts. The strong association between fee and class 
recovery persists in cases with recoveries of $100 million or more, as do the significant 
associations between fee level and fee method and risk.   
Courts granted the requested fee in over 70% of the cases with the Second Circuit 
granting the requested amount least often.  In cases in which the requested fee was not 
awarded, the mean fee was 68% of the requested amount.  Costs are modest with both 
means and median costs comprising less than 3% of the class recovery.  Fees and costs 
both exhibit scale effects with the percent of each decreasing as the class recovery 
amount increased.  Costs are strongly associated with hours expended on the case.  Fees 
were not significantly affected by the existence of a settlement class, the presence of 
3 Eisenberg and Miller, supra note 2. 
4 See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008); Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 
F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 n. 18 (4th Cir.1987). 
4objectors, or opt-outs from the class.   
Part II of this article describes the data gathering and coding.  Part III presents the 
relation between fee amount and class recovery and fee percent and class recovery over 
time, and by locale (including state and federal courts), and by case category.  It also 
explores the relation between the fee and risk, settlement class, and the presence of opt-
outs and objectors.  Part IV assesses the relation between the fee and the method used to 
compute the fee as well as the pattern of multipliers used in connection with lodestar fees. 
Part V reports on the pattern of costs and expenses.   Part VI presents multivariate results 
that confirm our core findings.  Part VII discusses the results and Part VIII concludes.
II. Methodology
 This results reported here were gathered in two segments.  The first segment 
covered cases reported from 1993 to 2002 and its results are reported in previous work.5
That study also described the motivation for the variables used in this study.  The basis 
for believing that the variables studied here might relate to fee awards is reasonably self-
evident and need not be repeated here.
As previously reported, we searched in the WESTLAW™ “AllCases” data base 
using the search “settlement & ‘class action’ & attorney! w/2 fee! & date(=[1993-2002])”  
This search’s results were checked against a search of the LEXIS™ “Mega” data base 
using equivalent search terms.  We also compiled lists of citations in the cases found by 
these search requests and included any additional cases meeting the basic search criteria.  
We further checked the list against the CCH™ Federal Securities and Trade Regulation 
Reporters.  Once cases had been identified by this method, we sometimes gathered 
additional information about case characteristics from other sources – for example, 
information on the Internet or docket entries in the U.S. Courts PACER system.  The 
second segment covered the period 2003 to 2008, inclusive.  We replicated the 
WESTLAW search (expanded to include the term ‘derivative’ to make doubly sure we 
picked up all derivative settlements) and checked the results, in many cases, against 
information available in PACER.   
The present study focuses solely on common fund cases and does not assess cases 
in which a court applied a statutory fee-shifting statute to assess fees.  Our searches and 
exclusion criteria yielded recovery and fee information for a total sample of 689 common 
fund cases.  Relatively more cases come from the later period (301 cases for six years 
from 2003 to 2008 compared with 388 cases for the preceding ten years).  This was due 
to the significantly expanded coverage of the PACER system in the later period and to 
our inclusion of cases in which fee-shifting statutes could have been applied but the fee 
was not determined by formally applying the fee-shifting statute.
 We used the following conventions for coding in both searches.  If the court 
stated a range of value (e.g., for the amount of class recovery), we used the midpoint.  If 
there was no better estimate available but a maximum recovery value could be 
ascertained, we used the maximum possible recovery.  If the court estimated the relief at 
“over” or “more than” a sum, the sum that was the minimum was used.  Where the 
settlement amount included post- or prejudgment interest, we included that in the amount 
5 For our prior empirical study of class action attorney fees, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 27 (2004).   
5of the settlement.   We collected only the number of attorney hours, thus excluding the 
(usually minor) hours reported for paralegals or law clerks.
 To code the court’s fee calculation method, we tracked whether the court engaged 
in a lodestar calculation and, if so, the purity of the lodestar approach.  This generated the 
following fee method categories: (1) percentage method cases in which no lodestar 
calculation exists, (2) cases in which both the lodestar calculation and the percentage 
approach were used (usually with the lodestar being employed as a “cross-check” on the 
percentage fee, and (3) pure lodestar cases in which the lodestar method was the 
exclusive method used.  If the lodestar amount was not specified, but could be estimated 
with reasonable accuracy, we included it. We used plaintiffs’ own estimates of their 
lodestar only when these estimates were not contested by the court.  In some cases, the 
court simply reported a fee without explaining its methodology; these we recorded as 
missing or as “negotiated” if the approved fee was the one negotiated by the parties.
 The coding of variables related to fee shifting was somewhat subtle.  Many class 
action cases are brought under numerous claims for relief, some of which authorize the 
court to award fees to the prevailing plaintiff or prevailing party.  When these cases 
settle, the courts often set fees without reference to the fee-shifting statute.  Even when 
fee-shifting statutes are potentially available, the fee is often awarded out of the class 
recovery.  Our “fee-shifting” variable simply codes whether the fee could have been 
calculated under a fee-shifting statute had the case progressed to a litigated judgment, 
regardless of whether the court actually invoked the fee-shifting statute as a basis for 
awarding the fee.  For the later cases (2003-2008) we kept track of whether the court had 
actually used the fee-shifting statute as a basis for awarding the fee.  In that period, a fee-
shifting statute was available in 177 cases but was used as the basis for awarding the fee 
in only 21 cases, 11.9%.  We included as common fund cases the 156 cases in which fee-
shifting statutes were available but were not used.  Preliminary regression models 
indicated no significant difference in fee awards between these cases and “purer” 
common fund cases.
 For many other variables, coding was reasonably straightforward. In employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases, two prominent categories of fee-shifting statute 
cases, the amount of the relief to the class, as expected, often was difficult to quantify 
because an important element of relief in such cases was often injunctive.  For civil rights 
cases involving only injunctive relief, the cost to the defendant was used as a measure of 
the value of the relief for the class when this was available.  In some fee-shifting cases, 
the court awarded attorneys’ fees but it was impossible to estimate the amount of class 
damages.  These fee and recovery coding conventions led to useable values for the fee 
amount and the client recovery, two of our core variables, in the 689 cases studied here.
We also coded cases for risk.  Where the court addressed the question of risk, we 
coded according to our best estimate of the court’s evaluation.  In many cases, however, 
the court did not explicitly address the risk of the litigation.   Coding therefore depended 
on assuming that risk was not prominent in cases in which courts did not mention it.  We 
divided the cases into three risk categories.  If nothing was said about risk or if the court’s 
discussion suggested a normal degree of risk, the case was coded as being medium risk.  
If the court affirmatively indicated the existence of substantial risk, or if exceptional risk 
6was evident from the facts or procedural history of the case, we coded the case as having 
high risk.  If the court indicated or the facts otherwise suggested that the case was very 
likely to generate a substantial recovery for the class at the time it was brought (for 
example, if the case grew out of a prior government prosecution that had resulted in fines 
or convictions), we coded the case as low risk.
 As in our earlier work, two caveats about using published opinions are in order.  
First, our data include only opinions that were published in some readily available form.  
Obviously, therefore, we have not included the full universe of cases in our data set.  
Although published opinions are not necessarily representative of the universe of all 
cases, however, they can lead to important insights.  For judges seeking to inform their 
fee decisions with knowledge of other cases, published opinions are the prime source of 
data.  Further, the present study expands on the published opinion data by delving into 
unpublished materials available on PACER when these could supply information missing 
from the published case reports. 
 A second caveat about the published opinion data is that this methodology over-
weights federal cases.  Opinions of state trial court judges are published less frequently 
than opinions of federal district courts; and since fee awards are typically reported in the 
court of first instance, we found many more federal than state opinions responsive to our 
search request.  Further, the PACER system allowed us to “dig” for more information in 
the case of federal opinions.  There is no state analog to PACER, and therefore we could 
only rarely discover information about fees and related issues when a state opinion on a 
class action or derivate case failed to report the necessary data. 
III. Bivariate Results:  Fee Amount and Fee Percent
 We first examine bivariate results—that is, the relation between either the fee 
amount or the fee percent and one of the other variables coded in our data.  We outline 
the persistent, impressively regular relationship between fees and recovery in both data 
sets (1993-2002 and 2003-2008).  We then examine the pattern of fees across other 
dimensions such as time, locale, case category, risk, settlement class status, and the 
presence of opt-outs and objectors.  All amounts are in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars.
A. The Persistent Relation Between Fee and Recovery
 The relation between fee amount and class recovery has remained consistent over 
time.  Figure 1 shows scatterplots of the fee amount and class recovery for each of the 
two time periods (1a and 1b), for the time periods combined (1c), and for cases with 
recoveries greater than or equal to $100 million (1d).  The scales have been transformed 
into log10 units to address the bunching of cases at the lower end of the recovery scale 
that would occur in a linear dollar scale.  Units of log10 can easily be interpreted because 
the log10 scale is simply based on powers of ten (e.g., a value of 9 on a log10 scale is 
equal to $1 billion, or one followed by nine zeros). 
 Figures 1a and 1b show that the pattern is virtually unchanged over time.  The 
associations between fee and recovery are striking and large.  The linear correlation 
between fee and recovery exceeds 0.94 for each time period and the slope of the 
relationships appears constant for the two time periods.  In a regression model with a 
dummy variable for time period and an interaction term consisting of the product of the 
7time period dummy variable and the class recovery size, one cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the dummy variable and the interaction term coefficients are jointly zero, thus 
confirming the consistency of the pattern.  The relation between fees and class recoveries 
can also be observed when all the data are combined, as shown in Figure 1c.  In both the 
separate and combined data sets, the size of the class recovery swamps all other 
influences on the size of the fee, as shown in regression models in Part VI. 6  Figure 1d, 
which is limited to large cases, also shows a strong linear relation between fee and 
recovery.   For these 109 cases, the linear correlation coefficient is 0.77 (p<0.0001).  The 
decreased slope for the high end of case recoveries is consistent with the scaling effect 
discussed in Part II.D. 
Figure 2 further supports the primacy of the recovery as the explanation for the 
fee award.  For ease of comparison, Figure 2a reproduces the combined time period data 
from Figure 1c.  Figures 2b and 2c show that neither the hours claimed nor the age of a 
case are as strongly associated with the fee amount as is the class recovery amount. 
6 Figure 1b shows the later time period with more low-recovery cases (less than $100,000).  This is likely 
attributable to our inclusion in the non-fee-shifting sample cases in which a fee-shifting statute existed but 
was not used, as well as to the information about smaller cases now available on PACER  See Part II supra. 
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Figure 1. Fee as a Function of Recovery
8 With six additional years of data, we can extend our prior analysis of the pattern 
of fees and class recoveries over time.  One notable earlier finding was the absence of 
increases in class recoveries or fees over time,7 a finding that heartened opponents of 
attempts to reform the class action system via the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA)8 and prompted a funded response from a noted Yale Law School professor.9
The newer data reveal that the level of both class recoveries and attorney fees has not 
varied substantially over time.  As Figure 3 shows, these amounts have shown no distinct 
time trend for most of 16 years.  Inflation adjusted recoveries and fees through 2007 were 
at levels not significantly different from where they were in 1993 and in fact are lower in 
inflation-adjusted dollars.  In 2008, a noticeable drop in mean and median recoveries and 
fees occurred.  The difference in class recovery medians between 2008 and all earlier 
years combined is statistically significant at p=0.002, and the difference in fees between 
2008 and earlier years is significant at p=0.0003.  The difference in the median ratio of 
fee to recovery (ratio of the logs) did not significantly differ between 2008 and earlier 
years (p=0.517).10  We therefore do not view the changes in 2008 as necessarily 
7  Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5. 
8 Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No., 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). See 149 Cong.Rec. S12999-02 (Oct. 
22, 2003) (remarks of Senator Feingold); 151 Cong.Rec. S1086-02 (Feb. 8, 2005) (remarks of Senator 
Feingold). 
9 George L. Priest, What We Know and What We Don’t Know About Modern Class Actions: A Review of 
the Eisenberg-Miller Study (Feb. 2005 Manhattan Inst.). 
10 This pattern of average and median fees in more recent years may be partly due to the increase in smaller 
cases which we were able to code by accessing the PACER data base and to inclusion in the later period of 
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9indicating anything significant about longer-term fee patterns. 
B. Locales and Case Categories
 Table 1 shows the distribution of cases by locale.  It combines all 25 federal 
appellate opinions into one category, “Appeal” and all 75 state cases into one category, 
“State”.  Federal district court cases dominate the sample, accounting for approximately 
85% of the cases.  The federal class action cases cluster by districts.  The Southern 
District of New York accounted for 103 of 589 federal district court cases, and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania accounted for 70 such cases.  They are the only two 
cases in which fee-shifting statutes were theoretically available but not used to set the fee.  We investigated 
whether a changing mix of cases explained the pattern by separately assessing, for the two time periods, 
cases with recoveries greater than or equal to $5 million and recoveries less than $5 million.  For both 
recovery size groups, the difference in recovery across the two time periods was not statistically 
significantly different.  The difference over time in medians for cases with recoveries greater than or equal 
to $5 million was significant at p=0.590; for cases with recoveries less than $5 million, the difference in 
medians was significant at p=0.749.  But the smaller cases were more prevalent in the later period.  Cases 
with recoveries of less than $5 million comprised 33% of the later period cases compared to 24% of the 
earlier period cases, a difference statistically significant at p=0.022.  Thus the decreasing recovery amount 
over time is attributable to a different mix of cases in our sample, and not to differences in treatment of 
similar cases over time.  Thus, throughout more than a decade of civil litigation reform efforts based on 
claims of increasing awards and fees, the pattern in available opinions, which tend to include the largest 
cases, has not significantly changed.  
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districts to account for 10% or more of the federal trial court portion of the sample and 
together accounted for 25% of all cases in the sample.  Two other districts accounted for 
more than five percent of the federal court portion of the sample: the Northern District of 
California had 47 cases and the District of New Jersey 35 cases.  The Northern District of 
Illinois had just under 5% of the federal district cases.  Together, these five districts 
accounted for over 50% of the federal district court opinions.  
 Table 1. Frequency of Class Action Fee Opinions, by Court, 1993-2008 
Locale N % of cases
Other 161 23.37
SDNY 103 14.95
State 75 10.89
EDPA 70 10.16
NDCA 47 6.82
DNJ 35 5.08
NDIL 29 4.21
EDNY 26 3.77
APPEAL 25 3.63
DDC 18 2.61
EDMI 17 2.47
DMN 16 2.32
EDLA 13 1.89
MDFL 12 1.74
EDCA 12 1.74
CDCA 10 1.45
DMA 10 1.45
SDCA 10 1.45
Total 689 100.00
Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
 These results suggest that class action litigation in the federal system is heavily 
concentrated in a few jurisdictions.  Of the 95 federal district courts, more than half of all 
class actions in our data set occurred in five courts.  Even adjusting for population (the 
popular class action districts also tend to be ones with large populations), the 
concentration ratio remains striking.  We take this as evidence that certain jurisdictions 
offer advantages for class action litigation, either in the form of experienced judges who 
can handle these cases in a fair and expeditious manner, faster dockets, a sense on the 
part of plaintiffs’ attorneys that the courts in these districts are reasonably well-inclined 
towards class action litigation, a concentration of class action attorneys specializing in the 
practice, or other factors. 
 We also investigated whether different federal courts appear to specialize in 
different types of cases.  Table 2 shows the breakdown of the four largest case types, plus 
the residual case type, “Other,” in the district courts with the largest number of class 
action settlements in our data (those listed in Table 1).  For each case category, one 
column shows the percent of cases in each district and a second column shows the 
number of cases. For example, the Southern District of New York account for 70 of 253 
Securities cases, 28% of the Securities cases.  Thus, the Southern District of New York 
11
tends to dominate securities class actions, whereas the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is 
the leader in Antitrust and Consumer cases.  The Northern and Eastern Districts of 
California are the leaders in Employment Cases.  Table 2 shows that the SDNY’s 
dominance is almost completely attributable to its large role in securities cases. 
Table 2.  Case Category by Locale, 1993-2008
Dist. Antitrust Consumer Employment Securities Other Total 
 % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Other 16% 10 35% 34 30% 15 21% 52 38% 49 27% 160 
SDNY 7% 4 1% 1 10% 5 28% 70 18% 23 18% 103 
EDPA 20% 12 14% 13 2% 1 14% 36 6% 8 12% 70 
NDCA 7% 4 7% 7 14% 7 8% 19 8% 10 8% 47 
DNJ 8% 5 7% 7 2% 1 6% 15 5% 7 6% 35 
NDIL 10% 6 7% 7 4% 2 5% 12 2% 2 5% 29 
EDNY 5% 3 7% 7 2% 1 6% 14 1% 1 4% 26 
DDC 16% 10 1% 1 0% 0 1% 2 4% 5 3% 18 
EDMI 3% 2 0% 0 0% 0 2% 6 7% 9 3% 17 
DMN 5% 3 3% 3 4% 2 2% 6 2% 2 3% 16 
EDLA 0% 0 3% 3 4% 2 2% 4 3% 4 2% 13 
EDCA 0% 0 2% 2 16% 8 0% 0 2% 2 2% 12 
MDFL 2% 1 2% 2 2% 1 3% 7 1% 1 2% 12 
CDCA 0% 0 2% 2 6% 3 1% 3 2% 2 2% 10 
DMA 2% 1 5% 5 0% 0 1% 2 2% 2 2% 10 
SDCA 0% 0 2% 2 4% 2 2% 5 1% 1 2% 10 
Total 100% 61 100% 96 100% 50 100% 253 100% 128 100% 588 
   Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
1. Fees Across Locales
 Table 3 shows summary statistics about fees and recoveries by locale.  The mean 
fee to recovery ratio was 0.23, or 23% of the class award, but this percent varies by 
recovery size, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 15 below.  The mean fee was $12.8 million 
and the median was $2.3 million.  The mean class recovery was $116.0 million and the 
median was $12.5 million.   
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 Table 3. Fee and Class Recoveries, by Locale, 1993-2008 
Mean
ratio 
Median 
ratio 
Mean
fee
Median 
fee
Mean
gross 
recovery
Median 
gross 
recovery
Number 
of cases 
APPEAL 0.19 0.20 5.89 2.15 57.86 13.37 25 
CDCA 0.25 0.25 3.93 2.75 16.30 19.90 10 
DDC 0.22 0.22 16.69 2.14 134.79 13.00 18 
DMA 0.16 0.15 11.50 7.00 118.55 81.00 10 
DMN 0.25 0.27 8.77 4.75 40.99 14.25 16 
DNJ 0.21 0.22 32.26 7.80 503.42 36.88 35 
EDCA 0.26 0.25 0.40 0.12 3.26 0.54 12 
EDLA 0.26 0.23 7.79 1.77 43.53 8.61 13 
EDMI 0.22 0.20 6.56 1.34 34.80 11.75 17 
EDNY 0.32 0.25 11.33 2.38 142.42 9.03 26 
EDPA 0.28 0.29 12.66 1.51 75.79 6.88 70 
MDFL 0.21 0.21 3.64 2.66 18.23 14.87 12 
NDCA 0.26 0.25 4.44 2.00 24.06 9.25 47 
NDIL 0.24 0.24 12.14 2.75 51.45 12.50 29 
Other 0.24 0.25 20.47 3.25 154.98 16.38 161 
SDCA 0.26 0.25 4.66 1.14 63.12 4.90 10 
SDNY 0.22 0.22 11.54 2.13 127.97 12.85 103 
State 0.20 0.20 5.94 2.00 61.61 12.32 75 
Total 0.23 0.24 12.84 2.33 116.01 12.50 689 
       Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
Some bankruptcy case fee studies11 and other studies of case outcomes show 
notable inter-district variation.  Like these studies, we find some significant variation 
across federal districts.  For the 16 federal districts with at least 10 cases with necessary 
information in the sample (including “Other” as a district), a test of the hypothesis that 
the median ratio of fee to class recovery does not differ significantly can be rejected, with 
a Mann-Whitney test yielding a significance level of p=0.014). Given the strong 
association between fee and class recovery, we explored these initial inter-district 
differences by accounting for recovery level and case category in regression models.  The 
district dummy variables were collectively statistically significant (p=0.035), indicating 
that when the size of class recoveries and case categories are accounted for, one can 
reject the hypothesis of no statistically significant inter-district differences.  Table 3’s 
first two numerical columns suggest that inter-district differences can be non-trivial but 
are not dramatic. With one exception, the median ratio always ranges from 0.20 to 0.29. 
In federal courts, attorney fee doctrine is dictated at the circuit court level if the 
appeals court has issued an opinion on point.  The Ninth Circuit has a 25% benchmark 
11 See Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 111, 114, 136 (2004) (showing significant fee 
request reduction variation across Delaware and Southern District of New York); Stephen J. Lubben, 
Corporate Reorganization and Professional Fees, 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 82 (2008) (showing some significant 
Delaware and Southern District of New York effects). But see Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty, 
Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 983, 
1010 (2008) (tbl. 5, showing insignificant Delaware and Southern District of New York effects). 
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fee in common fund cases but allows departures based on individual case factors,12 and 
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that its district courts view 25% as a benchmark.13  The 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits mandate the percentage method exclusively, while other 
circuits allow percentage or lodestar methods.14  The Second Circuit’s Goldberger
decision rejected the use of benchmarks and mandated a fact-specific inquiry.15
Table 4 explores inter-circuit variations, showing summary statistics about fees 
and recoveries by circuit and excludes state court cases.  The median and mean fee to 
recovery ratios were 0.24.  In regression models of the ratio, circuit dummy variables 
were not collectively statistically significant (p=0.124), indicating that when the size of 
class recoveries and case categories are accounted for, one cannot reject the hypothesis of 
no statistically significant inter-circuit differences.  We also explored differences between 
particular circuits and all other circuits based on announced benchmarks and methods.  In 
regression models using dummy variables for individual circuits, and controlling for case 
category and recovery size, none of the individual circuit effects were statistically 
significant.  Nor were differences within the Second Circuit significantly different pre- 
and post-Goldberger.16
Table 4. Fee and Class Recoveries, by Circuit,1993-2008 
Circuit Mean
ratio 
Median 
ratio 
Mean
fee
Median 
fee
Mean
gross 
recovery
Median 
gross 
recovery
Number 
of cases 
1st 0.20 0.20 31.83 3.50 227.41 19.32 21 
2nd 0.22 0.22 9.10 2.02 102.30 11.82 202 
3rd 0.26 0.26 17.27 3.00 193.15 13.38 122 
4th 0.20 0.21 29.27 1.89 320.07 13.55 8 
5th 0.24 0.23 32.39 2.63 368.34 15.65 26 
6th 0.23 0.23 10.42 3.33 94.65 15.50 42 
7th 0.26 0.24 8.79 2.15 38.37 10.07 42 
8th 0.25 0.29 10.96 4.02 66.53 14.23 30 
9th 0.25 0.25 4.64 1.92 32.17 9.33 113 
10th 0.22 0.23 12.46 7.42 63.96 32.00 22 
11th 0.20 0.20 16.94 4.22 92.97 26.85 38 
DC 0.21 0.22 15.17 1.94 122.04 11.00 20 
Total 0.24 0.24 12.87 2.34 116.24 12.50 686 
       Note. Three Federal Circuit cases are omitted. Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
12 E.g., Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993). 
13 Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 775 (11th Cir. 1991). 
14 Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. 
Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 1991). 
15 Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). 
16 Nor was the variance in fee percent significantly different between the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits and 
other circuits.  For a more in-depth exploration of the effect (or lack of effect) of the Goldberger decision, 
see Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, & Michael Perino, A New Look at Judicial Impact:  Attorneys’ 
Fees in Securities Class Actions after Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 29 Wash. U. J. Law and 
Policy 5 (2009). 
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2. State-Federal Differences
 We hypothesized that the fee percent would tend to be higher in state court class 
actions than in federal court class actions.17  Beliefs in differences in federal and state 
courts process class actions were cited as reasons for enactment of (CAFA).18  The 
Congress that enacted CAFA intended to route interstate class actions to federal court, 
“with the expressed intent of defeating the plaintiffs’ bar’s manipulation of state 
courts.”19  President George W. Bush declared that it “marks a critical step toward ending 
the lawsuit culture in our country.”20  Empirical support for CAFA was almost entirely 
lacking, however, with both Federal Judicial Center (FJC) research21 and our own prior 
work22 suggesting little in the way of significant state-federal defenses. 
 Table 3 above shows that the mean fee to class recovery ratio for state court cases 
was 0.20, slightly lower than the overall mean ratio of 0.23.  Regression models that 
model the fee (log 10) or the ratio (of logs) as a function of the case category and the 
class recovery size indicate that the federal-state difference was sometimes statistically 
significant in the direction suggested by Table 3 – namely, that state courts award lower 
percentage fees.23  The direction of the effect is surprising if one believes federal courts 
are less receptive to class actions than are state courts.  A lower fee to recovery ratio 
suggests somewhat less encouragement of class action activity by state courts compared 
to federal courts.    
3. Case Categories
 Table 5 summarizes fees, recoveries, and their ratios by case categories.  Mean 
fees ranged from 11% of the class recovery in Tax cases to 27% in Employment cases.  
In the larger case categories fees ranged from 21% to 27% of recoveries.  A test of the 
hypothesis that the median ratio of fees to recoveries are the same across case categories 
can be rejected at p<0.022, if one includes the small Civil Rights and Tax categories.  But 
the effect becomes statistically insignificant if one excludes the two smallest categories 
(p=0.222).
17 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5. 
18 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  See generally Kevin 
M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1553 (2008); Georgene M. Vairo, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (2005). 
19 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 18. 
20 Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 265, 265 (Feb. 
18, 2005); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective:  The Old and the 
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1823 (2008) (stressing partisan support for 
CAFA).
21 Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: 
What Difference Does It Make?, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 591, 645, 652-54 (2006) (finding insignificant 
differences in state court and federal court treatment of class actions, and observing that “[a]ttorney 
perceptions of judicial predispositions toward their clients’ interests show little or no relationship to the 
judicial rulings in the surveyed [state and federal class action] cases”).  See also Part VII below. 
22 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5. 
23 The state court effect was significant in multilevel models with a random intercept for case category.  
The effect was insignificant in models with dummy variables for case category. 
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Table 5. Fee and Class Recoveries, by Case Category,1993-2008 
Mean
ratio 
Median 
ratio 
Mean
fee
Median 
fee
Mean
gross 
recovery
Median 
gross 
recovery
Number 
of cases 
Antitrust 0.22 0.23 21.02 9.15 163.48 39.36 71 
Civil Rights 0.24 0.23 4.10 1.52 16.53 7.48 18 
Consumer 0.25 0.20 10.04 1.70 128.42 9.33 125 
Corporate 0.21 0.19 3.35 1.12 16.51 9.86 30 
Employment 0.27 0.25 2.43 0.75 12.28 3.00 55 
ERISA 0.23 0.25 6.61 3.46 29.54 14.00 43 
Securities 0.23 0.25 14.78 2.52 141.96 12.50 268 
Tax Refund/Tax 0.11 0.06 12.96 5.50 188.01 60.07 8 
Tort 0.21 0.20 30.15 6.63 254.60 25.86 29 
Other 0.23 0.25 13.59 2.00 61.86 10.75 42 
Total 0.23 0.24 12.84 2.33 116.01 12.50 689 
   Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
The case category makeup of the samples varied over time. Table 6 shows the 
case category breakdown for the time period of our prior study and the years, 2003 to 
2008, added for purposes of this study.  In each time period, Securities cases were the 
dominant case category.  But it declined as a proportion of the sample in the later time 
period.  This is dues to the increase in proportion of Civil Rights, Employment, and 
ERISA cases, which likely increased because of the change in coding, discussed above, 
to allow inclusion with common fund cases, cases subject to a fee-shifting statute but in 
which the fee was not determined pursuant to the statute.  
Table 6. Frequency of Case Categories, by Time Period 
 Non-fee-shifting Cases 
 1993-2002 2003-2008 
 N % of cases 
in period 
N % of cases 
in period 
Antitrust 36 11.9 35 10.3 
Civil Rights 2 0.7 16 2.6 
Consumer 52 17.2 73 18.1 
Corporate 15 5.0 15 4.4 
Employment 7 2.3 48 8.0 
ERISA 7 2.3 36 6.2 
Securities 142 46.9 126 38.9 
Tax Refund/Tax 6 2.0 2 1.2 
Tort 17 5.6 12 4.2 
Other 19 6.3 23 6.1 
Total 303 100 386 100 
      Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
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 Figure 4 explores whether the core relation between fee amount and class 
recovery varies by case category.  It shows that relation through separate scatterplots for 
ten case categories.  The consistency of the pattern across category is striking.  Every 
category shows the same basic relation between fee and recovery.   
D. Scaling Effect
 The existence of a scaling effect—the fee percent decreases as class recovery 
increases—is central to justifying aggregate litigation such as class actions.  Plaintiffs’ 
ability to aggregate into classes that reduce the percentage of recovery devoted to fees 
should be a hallmark of a well-functioning class action system.24  As Figure 5 shows, a 
substantial scaling effect existed in the 2003-2008 period, as well as in the earlier 1993-
2002 period.  The linear correlation coefficient for 2003-2008 was -0.57 and for 1993-
2002 was -0.50, both statistically significant at p<0.0001. The lines in the figure show the 
best-fitting regression line for each data subset.  
24 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5.  
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Figure 5. Fee as a Percent of Recovery for Two Time Periods
Table 7 presents additional information about the scale effect.  For purposes of 
this table, we divided the range of class recoveries into deciles of about 69 cases each.  
Table 7’s first column shows the bounds on the deciles, starting with the lowest decile of 
class recoveries.  Thus the table’s first numerical row include cases with class recoveries 
in the first decile, those recoveries less than or equal to $1.1 million.  The table’s last  
row includes cases in the highest decile, those with recoveries greater than $175.5 
million.  The table’s column show, within each decile range, the mean, median, and 
standard deviation of the fee percent for the row decile. Thus, for the 69 cases with class 
recoveries of less than $1.1 million, the mean fee percent award was 37.9% in 69 cases, 
the median fee percent award was 32.3%, and the standard deviation was 19.6%.  
Although there is some fluctuation in the scale effect trend across the middle deciles, the 
overall trend is clear with the highest decile having less than one-third of the median and 
mean percentage fee than the lowest decile. 
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 Table 7. Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of  Fee Percent, 
 Controlling for Class Recovery Amount, 1993-2008 
Range of class recovery 
(millions) decile  
Mean Median Standard deviation N 
Recovery <=1.1 37.9 32.3 19.6 69 
Recovery >1.1 <=2.8 27.1 26.4 9.1 69
Recovery >2.8 <=5.3 26.4 25.0 9.8 69 
Recovery >5.3 <=8.7 22.8 22.1 8.4 69
Recovery >8.7 <=14.3 23.8 25.0 8.1 69 
Recovery >14.3<=22.8 22.7 23.5 7.5 69
Recovery >22.8 <=38.3 22.1 24.9 8.7 68 
Recovery >38.3 <=69.6 20.5 21.9 10.0 70
Recovery >69.6 <=175.5 19.4 19.9 8.4 69 
Recovery >175.5 12.0 10.2 7.9 68
   Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
E. Risk 
 Standards applied to attorney fees uniformly indicate that greater risk warrants an 
increased fee.25  Table 8 reports, by case category, the mean fee percent separately for 
high risk and other cases.  It confirms that courts systematically reward risk.  For every 
case category except Antitrust and Other, mean fee percents were higher in high risk 
cases than in other cases.  The difference within a case category between high risk cases 
and other cases was statistically significant only for the large Securities category (t-test 
significance level, p=0.006). 
 Table 8. Fee Percent, by Risk Level 
 High risk Low/medium risk 
 N Fee % N Fee % 
Antitrust 9 20.1 62 22.2 
Civil Rights 4 29.3 13 23.2 
Consumer 14 31.3 110 24.7 
Corporate 4 23.4 26 20.8 
Employment 4 35.1 51 26.2 
ERISA   5 24.6 38 23.2 
Securities 45 26.4 217 22.7 
Tax Refund/Tax - - 8 10.8 
Tort 8 25.1 21 19.0 
Other 13 22.1 29 23.9 
Total 106 26.1 575 23.1 
Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
F. Settlement Classes, Opt Outs, and Objectors 
Table 9 reports the relation between the fee percent and three class action case 
characteristics: settlement class status (panel A),26 whether any objection was filed (panel 
25 E.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000). 
26 A settlement class is a case in which a class was certified for settlement purposes only.   
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B), and the number of class members opting out of the class (panel C).  We collected 
useful data on these issues only for the later time period (2003-2008).  No significant 
difference in fee percent for settlement class cases compared to non-settlement class 
cases emerged.  There were significant differences in the fee percent for cases with and 
without objectors.  Cases with objectors tended to have higher fee percents than cases 
without objectors.  Cases with more than one opting out class member tended to have 
lower fee percents than cases with zero or one opting out class member.  But, in 
regression models that supplement those reported in Table 17 below, the objector and opt 
out variables were found not to be significant once one controlled for recovery size.
 Table 9. Fee Percent & Settlement Classes, Opt Outs, Objectors 
 Period 2003-2008 
 N Fee % 
A. Settlement class status   
  Settlement class 208 24.4% 
  Not a settlement class 160 25.4% 
B. Presence of Objectors   
  Any objector 142 23.4% 
  No objector 123 28.6% 
C. Number of opt outs   
  No opt outs 28 34.6% 
  One opt out 20 37.2% 
  >1 opt out 116 23.6% 
Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
IV. Bivariate Results: Fee Methods and Multipliers 
The dominant method used to calculate fees in class actions has evolved from 
considering multiple factors27 to the dominance of two other methods, the lodestar and 
percentage methods.  Under the lodestar method, courts multiply the reasonable number 
of hours expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate and then adjust the product for 
various factors.28  Under the percentage method, the court multiplies the amount 
recovered on behalf of the class by a percentage factor.  Some courts adopt a blended 
approach that checks the percentage method for reasonableness against a lodestar 
calculation.29  We explore here the rates at which courts use the fee calculation methods, 
the relation between those methods and fees, the rates at which courts granted requested 
fees, and the use of multipliers in cases using the lodestar method. 
27 The factors include the time and labor required, the customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 
the amount involved and the results obtained, the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, 
awards in similar cases, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, the time 
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, the preclusion of other employment by the attorney 
due to acceptance of the case, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, the skill needed to perform the 
legal services, and the “undesirability” of the case. The leading precedent outlining this multifactor 
approach is Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). 
28 E.g., Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002).  See Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a 
New Fee Award Procedure, 70 Texas L. Rev. 865 (1992); Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar 
Method: You Can't Get There from Here, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1809 (2000). 
29 See notes 12-15 supra for circuit-level case law addressing the fee method to be used. 
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A. Lodestar
1. Frequency of Use of Lodestar vs. Percent
 Table 10 reports the rate of use of competing methods of computing a fee award. 
One result is the decline in the use of the lodestar method.  From 1993 to 2002, 13.6 
percent of cases used a pure lodestar method.  From 2003 to 2008 only 9.6% of cases 
used the lodestar method, a notable reduction, but one that was not statistically significant 
(p=0.136).  This is likely due to the relatively small number of cases using the lodestar 
method exclusively. 
 Table 10. Frequency of Method Used, by Time Period 
 1993-2002 2003-2008 
 N % of cases in period N % of cases in period 
Lodestar 38 13.6 37 9.6 
Percent 158 56.4 146 37.8 
Both  (usually % with LS check) 68 24.3 165 42.8 
Other 16 5.7 38 9.8 
Total 280 100 386 100 
      Note. LS=lodestar method. Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
 Table 10 also suggests a reduction in use of the pure percent method, from 56.4% 
to 37.8%.  But this understates the dominance of the percent method.  For the 1993 to 
2002 period, we coded which method was primary and which was used as a check.  In 
non-fee-shifting cases in this period, 61 cases used the percent method with a lodestar 
check compared with three cases that used the lodestar method with the percent method 
as a check.  The 68 cases shown as using “Both” methods in the earlier period included 
an additional four cases that used both methods without indicating which was dominant.  
So cases coded as using “Both” methods were almost always percent method cases with a 
lodestar check.  We used less detailed coding of the method in the second period.  If a 
case used both methods, we simply coded it as “Both.”  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
assume that the “Both” cases in the second period are similar to those in the earlier period 
and are dominated by the percent method with the lodestar as a check.  So our best 
estimate is that the percent method is the overwhelmingly dominant method of computing 
fees, either as the sole method or as the primary method with the lodestar as a check.  
Figure 6 shows the rate of pure lodestar use over time, with a separate line for the large 
subset of securities class actions.  Figure 1’s strong linear correlation between fee and 
recovery supports this assessment as a lodestar-dominated system would likely show a 
less strong association between fee and class recovery.
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Table 11 limits the sample to federal cases and shows the fee method used broken 
down by circuit.  As suggested by Table 10, the use of the percent method, combined 
with the use of the percent method with a lodestar check, dominates.  Table 11 shows that 
this is the pattern in every circuit, regardless of formal fee method doctrine.  The lodestar 
method peaks at 21% of cases in the Sixth Circuit and only the Second Circuit combines 
nontrivial lodestar use with a substantial number of cases.  The table slightly overstates 
the more recent federal rate of lodestar use, which totaled only 9% in cases from 2003 to 
2008.
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Figure 6. Pure Lodestar Use Over Time
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Table 11. Fee Method by Circuit, Federal Cases, 1993-2008 
Circuit Lodestar Percent Both Other Total 
 % N % N % N % N % N 
1st 5% 1 60% 12 35% 7 0% 0 100% 20 
2nd 19% 26 37% 51 40% 55 5% 7 100% 139 
3rd 5% 6 37% 43 56% 65 3% 3 100% 117 
4th 13% 1 50% 4 38% 3 0% 0 100% 8 
5th 20% 5 40% 10 36% 9 4% 1 100% 25 
6th 21% 8 62% 24 13% 5 5% 2 100% 39 
7th 10% 4 61% 25 17% 7 12% 5 100% 41 
8th 0% 0 59% 17 34% 10 7% 2 100% 29 
9th 9% 9 48% 48 30% 30 13% 13 100% 100 
10th 9% 2 41% 9 45% 10 5% 1 100% 22 
11th 3% 1 52% 17 36% 12 9% 3 100% 33 
D.C. 0% 0 50% 10 35% 7 15% 3 100% 20 
Federal Circuit 0% 0 100% 3 0% 0 0% 0 100% 3 
Total 11% 63 46% 273 37% 220 7% 40 100% 596 
       Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
2. Is Use of the Lodestar Method Associated with Lower Fee Awards?
 Table 12 explores the relation between fee method and fee percent.  Although, the 
table’s first row suggests a substantial increase in fee percents in lodestar cases over time, 
the higher fee percents in recent lodestar cases is an artifact of case category.  Consumer 
cases comprise 37% of the lodestar category and the difference between percent and 
lodestar methods vanishes if one excludes Consumer cases.  The Consumer case category 
percent of cases changed for the two periods in our sample.  Consumer cases were 59.5% 
of the lodestar cases in the later period compared to 15.8% of the lodestar cases in the 
earlier period.  The lodestar method was used at a higher rate, 23.0%, in Consumer cases 
than in any cases category other than the small Tax category.  These high-percent 
Consumer cases (see Table 8) are the source of the change in mean lodestar fee percents 
over time.  The increased prominence of Consumer cases in the later period sample is 
likely attributable to our including as common fund cases those in which a fee-shifting 
statute was theoretically available but was not in fact used.  In regression models, 
reported below (see Table 17), the percent and “Both” fee methods have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients compared to the lodestar method once case category 
is controlled for. 
Table 12. Fee Percent by Method Used, by Time Period 
 1993-2002 2003-2008 
 N Mean fee % of recovery N Mean fee % of recovery 
Lodestar 38 17.2 37 31.6 
Percent 158 23.4 146 25.3 
Both (usually % with LS check) 68 22.9 165 21.9 
Other 16 11.4 38 28.7 
Total 280 21.7 386 24.8 
     Note. LS=lodestar method. Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
 For the period 2003 to 2008, we coded the hours worked by attorneys in cases 
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with opinions reporting that information.  The lower lodestar awards appear to be a 
consequence of fewer hours worked, or at least fewer hours claimed in court filings.  
Fewer hours were worked, on average, in lodestar method cases than in other cases and 
fewer hours were worked in Consumer cases than in any other case category.  As in 
regressions of the fee amount, regression of hours worked that controlled for fee method, 
case category, and circuit yielded coefficients for the Percent and Both method dummy 
variables that are statistically significant and positive compared to lodestar cases.  
B. Fee Grant Rates 
 Fee requests were generally granted in the amount requested, with 72.5% of 
requests granted in full, as shown in Table 13’s last row.  Our data for the rate of grants is 
limited to the 2003 to 2008 period because requested amounts were not recorded for the 
earlier time period.  Table 13 shows that strong intercircuit differences (p=0.012, 
excluding the two Federal Circuit cases) in the grant rate existed, with the Second Circuit 
granting the requested amount statistically significantly less often than the Third Circuit 
or the Ninth Circuit.  These intercircuit differences remain significant in logistic 
regression models that control for case category and recovery amount, and in models that 
exclude securities cases.  The table also shows that state courts tended to grant award 
requests at a lower rate than federal courts.  The difference federal and state grant rates 
was only statistically significant at p=0.148. 
Table 13.  Rates at Which Requested Fees Were Given by Locale, 2003-2008 
Locale Proportion of fee requests granted in 
the amount requested 
N
1st 0.70 10 
2nd 0.54 74 
3rd 0.83 64 
4th 0.60 5 
5th 0.69 13 
6th 0.79 24 
7th 0.79 14 
8th 0.83 18 
9th 0.83 72 
10th 0.77 13 
11th 0.64 22 
D.C. 0.80 10 
Federal Circuit 0.50 2 
State court 0.59 22 
Total 0.72 363 
     Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
 Fee requests were not granted in full in 100 of 363 cases.  In those cases, the 
mean fee grant was 68% of the request and the median was 74%.  The mean grant of 61% 
in state court cases was lower than the 69% in federal court cases and the median of 66% 
in state court cases was also lower than the median of 75% in federal court cases.  But 
only 9 of the 100 cases with less than full grants were state court cases. 
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C. Multipliers 
Courts often check the percentage-based attorneys’ fee against the lodestar award.  
If the percentage fee grossly exceeds the lodestar amount, the fee may be deemed 
excessive, and the courts can adjust the fee downward to a more reasonable range.  Table 
14 reports, for federal cases, the mean multiplier applied by circuit and by case category.  
The sample is limited to those cases that reported a multiplier that was not equal to one.   
Table 14.  Mean Multiplier by Circuit and Case Category 
 Mean multiplier N 
A. Circuit   
1st 2.10 15 
2nd 1.58 97 
3rd 2.01 87 
4th 2.43 7 
5th 2.07 15 
6th 1.97 22 
7th 1.85 16 
8th 2.30 14 
9th 1.54 50 
10th 1.91 14 
11th 1.19 19 
D.C. 2.23 11 
Federal Circuit 1.54 1 
Total 1.81 368 
B. Case category   
Antitrust 2.24 38 
Civil Rights 1.99 11 
Consumer 1.82 60 
Corporate 1.94 7 
Employment 1.24 21 
ERISA 1.58 29 
Securities 1.75 177 
Tort 1.83 11 
Other 2.35 14 
Total 1.81 368 
Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER.
 The mean multiplier ranged from 1.19 in the Eleventh Circuit to 2.43 in the 
Fourth Circuit. Across case categories, the mean multiplier ranged from 2.35 in Other to 
1.24 in Employment cases.  But, in regression models of the multiplier (log) as a function 
of circuits and case categories, neither the dummy variables for circuits nor for case 
categories were collectively significant.  We therefore cannot reject the hypotheses that 
multipliers are similar across circuits and case categories. 
 We do, however, find significantly different multipliers used in cases in which 
fee-shifting statutes were available and cases in which they were not.  With no statute in 
the background, multipliers averaged 1.96 in 161 cases with necessary data.  If a fee-
shifting statute was available, multipliers averaged 1.38 in 66 cases.  The difference in 
medians was significant at p=0.021. 
Figure 7 shows the relation between the fee outcomes, percent and amount, and 
multipliers (7a and 7b), and between multiplier and hours reported (7c).   
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Since a suspected fee windfall is most likely to occur when the percentage method 
would yield what is perceived to be too high a fee, we expect the multiplier to tend to 
bring high percentage fee cases into a more moderate range.  We therefore predicted and 
found, in our prior study, a strong negative correlation between the lodestar multiplier 
(fee award divided by the lodestar) and the percentage fee awarded.30  A similar relation 
exists for 2003-2008, as shown in Figure 7a.  Higher multipliers should, in general, lead 
to higher recoveries, a result shown in Figure 7b.  Increased multipliers do not appear to 
be being used a reward for hours worked.  Figure 7c shows no clear positive association 
between mutlipliers and hours. 
 Table 15 presents more detailed information about the relation between 
class recovery and multipliers.  It uses the recovery deciles reported in Table 7, though 
note that fewer observations are included in Table 15 because of the limitation of the 
sample to cases with multipliers not equal to one.  The table reports the mean, median, 
and standard deviation for each recovery decile.  The pattern for the mean and median 
multiplier confirms that suggested by Figure 7b.  As the recovery decile increases, the 
multiplier also tends to increase, with the multiplier in the highest recovery decile more 
than triple that of the multiplier in the lowest recovery decile.  
30 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5. 
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 Table 15. Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Multiplier, 
 Controlling for Class Recovery Amount, 1993-2008 
Range of class recovery 
(millions) decile  
Mean Median Standard deviation N 
Recovery <=1.1 0.88 0.74 0.45 33 
Recovery >1.1 <=2.8 0.95 0.77 0.67 40
Recovery >2.8 <=5.3 1.44 1.25 0.74 32 
Recovery >5.3 <=8.7 1.59 1.25 1.32 34
Recovery >8.7 <=14.3 1.49 1.45 0.87 37 
Recovery >14.3<=22.8 1.68 1.51 0.85 38
Recovery >22.8 <=38.3 1.83 1.44 1.44 33 
Recovery >38.3 <=69.6 1.98 1.75 1.00 38
Recovery >69.6 <=175.5 2.70 2.09 2.43 43 
Recovery >175.5 3.18 2.60 1.99 40
   Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
V. Costs and Expenses 
 Costs and expenses (collectively “costs”) tended to be a small percentage of the 
class recovery and have remained a fairly constant percentage over time.  For the 232 
cases from 1993 to 2002 for which cost data were available, mean costs were 2.8% of the 
recovery and median costs were 1.7%.  For the 304 cases with necessary data from 2003 
to 2008, mean costs were 2.7% of the recovery and median costs remained at 1.7%.  As 
before, we found no evidence that the cost percent increased over time.31
 We further explored costs as a function of four variables: (1) the class recovery, 
(2) the fee, (3) the hours reported in the court’s opinion, and (4) the age of the case in 
years.  We only coded hours billed and case age beginning with the 2003 to 2008 data.  
Figure 8 shows the relation between costs and the four factors and limits the sample to 
cases in which hours were reported in opinions and costs were at least $100.  All four 
factors are positively associated with costs.  The figure also suggests that the strongest 
association is between costs and hours.
31 Id. 
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Note. Cases with age greater than 10 years old are coded as 10 years old. Sources: Westlaw, 
LexisNexis, PACER. 
Table 16 shows the correlation coefficients between costs and the four factors in 
Figure 8.  The first four numerical columns cover the period 2003-08, for which hours 
data were recorded.  The last two numerical columns show the correlation between costs 
and fee and recovery for the period 1993-2002.  The correlations between costs and 
recovery and fee for either period do not reach the strength of association of hours and 
costs in the later period.  The weaker correlation between costs and age may be in part of 
function of age being coded only in whole years and therefore providing a less 
continuous measure of that factor. 
Table 16.  Correlations Between Costs and Four Factors 
 Fee  (log 10) Recovery 
(log 10) 
Hours 
(log) 
Age in years Fee  (log 10) Recovery 
(log 10) 
 Period = 2003-08 Period = 1993-2002 
Correlation Coeff. 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.34 0.77 0.71 
Significance <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
N 167 167 167 167 232 232 
Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
A regression model, not reported here, of costs as a percent of recovery controls 
for case category and other factors, shows that costs, like fees, have a scale effect: their 
percent of recovery significantly declines as the size of the recovery increases.  The cost 
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percent significantly increases hours.  In a model with both case age and hours as 
explanatory variables, only hours were statistically significant.
VI. Multivariate Results
 Some of the above results are so strong and robust that no further analysis is 
needed to support their existence.  The strong correlation between fees and class recovery 
and the scale effect survive any reasonable analysis and are reasonably captured by 
Figures 1 and 7, and confirmed in regression models reported below.  Other key results  
consist of factors associated with the level of the fee award.  These include: 
1. the tendency of state courts to award a lower percent of recovery as a fee,  
 2. the relation between case category and fee percent, 
3. the tendency of high risk cases to receive a higher percent of the class recovery 
as a fee, and 
4. the tendency of lodestar awards in non-fee-shifting cases to be lower than 
percent-method awards. 
This Part first explores the robustness of these results to simultaneous control for 
recovery level and then reports regression models. 
A. The Relation Between the Fee Award and State Court Status, Risk, and the    
Lodestar Method
 As Figure 1 and our earlier work suggest, for most explanatory variables the size 
of the class recovery is the most important potential confounding factor in assessing the 
relation between other covariates and the fee award.  From Figures 1 and 7, we know 
that: (1) the fee award increased with class recovery, and (2) the fee award was a 
declining percent of the class recovery as the class recovery increased.  Regression 
models assessing non-recovery covariates thus require both a dummy variable for the 
covariate, and an interaction term between the covariate and the class recovery.  That is, 
the covariate may influence both the intercept and the slope of the line representing the 
relation between the covariate and the fee award.  The use of class recovery, a dummy 
covariate, and an interaction term raises problems of multicollinearity in the regression 
model, which preliminary analysis confirmed.  The problems arose even when a single 
covariate and interaction term were included in regression models, and were magnified 
when multiple covariates and interaction terms were used.  Rather than simply report 
possible questionable regression models, we first used a simpler technique to explore the 
possible influence of certain covariates on the fee award while simultaneously accounting 
for the class recovery.
 Table 17 expands on Part III’s tables by reporting in more detail, for non-fee-
shifting cases, the relation between the fee awarded and three key covariates—state court 
status, risk, and use of the lodestar method—while controlling for the size of the class 
recovery.  As was done for Table 7 and Table 15 above, we divided the range of class 
recoveries into deciles.  Table 17’s first column shows the bounds on the deciles, starting 
with the lowest decile of class recoveries.  Each decile’s statistics are reported in two 
rows, the first shows the fee percent and the second row shows the number of cases 
included in the fee percent calculation.  Thus the table’s first two numerical rows include 
cases with class recoveries in the first decile, those recoveries less than or equal to $1.1 
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million.  The table’s last two rows include cases in the highest decile, those with 
recoveries greater than $175.5 million.  The table’s second and third columns show, 
within each decile range, the mean fee percent award and the number of cases, divided by 
federal court vs. state court status.  Thus, for the 69 cases with class recoveries of less 
than $1.1 million, the mean federal case fee percent award was 38.7% in 64 cases and the 
mean state case fee percent award was 27.2% in 5 cases.  The table’s fourth and fifth 
columns show the same information, but now divided by high risk case status vs. 
low/medium risk case status.  The table’s sixth and seventh columns show the same 
information divided by use of the pure lodestar method vs. use of all other methods. 
 Table 17. Influence of Locale, Risk, and Lodestar Method on Percent Fee Award 
 Controlling for Class Recovery Amount, 1993-2008 
 Federal-State Risk Lodestar 
Range of class recovery 
(millions) decile  
Federal 
case
State
case
Low/medium 
risk case 
High 
risk case 
Non-pure 
lodestar 
Pure
lodestar 
Recovery <=1.1 38.7 27.2 37.1 48.4 32.3 58.0 
N 64 5 64 5 53 15 
Recovery >1.1 <=2.8 26.8 30.4 26.7 29.5 26.6 33.4 
N 63 6 60 9 64 5
Recovery >2.8 <=5.3 27.0 23.2 26.0 29.3 26.8 17.9 
N 58 11 61 8 65 2 
Recovery >5.3 <=8.7 22.7 23.2 21.8 26.8 23.3 20.5 
N 61 8 55 14 54 9
Recovery >8.7 <=14.3 24.1 21.4 23.3 26.8 24.8 19.0 
N 61 8 58 11 56 11 
Recovery >14.3<=22.8 23.3 15.6 22.7 23.0 23.3 16.3 
N 62 6 63 6 61 6
Recovery >22.8 <=38.3 22.3 20.8 20.9 29.2 24.0 11.7 
N 58 10 58 10 53 11 
Recovery >38.3 <=69.6 21.2 15.7 19.9 24.6 21.6 9.8 
N 61 9 62 8 61 7
Recovery >69.6 <=175.5 19.6 16.0 17.3 24.7 20.0 10.0 
N 64 5 50 19 62 4 
Recovery >175.5 12.6 6.5 10.6 16.5 12.7 4.3 
 N 61 7 52 16 62 5
   Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
 With respect to federal vs. state court status, the mean state case fee percent is 
lower than the mean federal percent for every recovery decile except the second and 
fourth.  Thus, after controlling for class recovery size, it is the case that state courts tend 
to award lower fees than federal courts but not overwhelmingly so.  The pattern is even 
more consistent with respect to risk.  For every recovery decile, the fee percent is higher 
in high risk cases than in low/medium risk cases.  The lodestar effect follows the same 
trend, with every class recovery decile except the lowest two showing a lower fee percent 
in pure lodestar cases than in other cases.  In the low recovery deciles, of course, the 
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lodestar method can compensate attorneys for substantial efforts that a percent fee award 
may not fully reflect.  Part III’s results for these three covariates therefore survive 
analysis that controls for the key potential confounder, the class recovery size. 
B. Regression Models 
 Table 18 reports ordinary least squares regression models that confirm our core 
results.  Model (1) shows that over 90% of the variance in the fee is explained by the size 
of the recovery.  None of the other models add materially to the explanatory power of this 
simple model.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the model with the largest set of 
explanatory variables, model (5), shows no statistically significant difference between 
state and federal courts.  The models also consistently confirm that fee methods other 
than the pure lodestar method tend to have higher fees.  And the models confirm the 
association between greater risk and increased fees.32  In model (5), a test of the 
hypothesis that the case category dummy variables are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected at p=0.0003.  Their significance persists if one omits the two small cases 
categories, civil rights and tax, but the significance level increases to p=0.012.  The 
significance of the results in Table 18 persists if one limits the sample to the 106 cases 
with recoveries of $100 million or more but the sizes of the coefficients do change.  The 
percent of variance explained then ranges from 72% to 77% depending on the model. 
Table 18. Regression Models of Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable = Fee (log10) 
Gross recovery (log10) 0.850 0.850 0.846 0.833 0.827 
 (74.37)** (73.79)** (73.32)** (62.21)** (61.35)** 
State court case  -0.088 -0.083 -0.040 0.003 
  (8.25)** (8.15)** (3.13)** (0.15) 
High risk case   0.111 0.102 0.098 
   (7.16)** (6.06)** (5.06)** 
Lodestar = reference category     
Percent method    0.188 0.169 
    (4.76)** (4.22)** 
Both methods    0.181 0.158 
    (4.82)** (4.15)** 
Other methods    0.032 0.028 
    (0.62) (0.51) 
Constant 0.374 0.382 0.616 0.535 0.635 
 (4.91)** (4.69)** (6.54)** (4.50)** (4.35)** 
Case category dummies No No No No Yes 
Observations 689 688 681 663 663 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Notes. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; standard errors 
are clustered by locale. Sources: Westlaw, LexisNexis, PACER. 
32 Multilevel models, using random intercepts for locale and case category, do not yield materially different 
results. 
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VII. Discussion 
The data support several major conclusions.   
Strength of Relation and Dominance of Method.  The percentage fee method is 
overwhelmingly the method used by courts in awarding fees in class actions.  It is so 
widely used and so consistently employed that other information about cases adds little 
explanatory power to study of the fee award.  The amount of the class recovery dwarfs all 
other effects.  Even in circuits that eschew the percentage method, it appears to be the 
dominant de facto method used and best explains the pattern of awards.  The consistent 
pattern may help attorneys to calibrate their fee requests and lead to courts usually 
approving the requested fee amount. 
Scale Effect and Aggregate Litigation. The pattern of class action awards 
continues to exhibit a strong scale effect.  Attorneys receive a smaller proportion of the 
recovery as the size of the recovery increases.  Aggregation of claims thus appears to 
have produced the kind of efficiency hoped for.  This characteristic of aggregate litigation 
should be considered when evaluating devices designed to preclude or discourage 
aggregate litigation or arbitration, such as prohibitions on class arbitration.33
The Scope and Nature of Our Sample. Some perspective on the scope of our 
sample relative to the universe of class action cases comes from a study of class actions 
against insurers from 1993 through 2002.  The RAND Institute for Civil Justice surveyed 
269 property and casualty insurers and 207 life and health insurers, received responses 
from 205 companies, and obtained useable information from 199 insurers.34  Of 564 
attempted class actions, 12% led to a class settlement35  In 32 cases, the respondents 
provided information about the aggregate pool of funds offered to settle the case and its 
associated expenses.  The amounts ranged from $360,000 to $150 million, with a mean 
fund size of $12.8 million and a median size of $2.6 million.  Almost two-thirds of the 
cases, 62.5%, resulted in a common fund of less than $5 million.36  In 48 cases, the 
respondents supplied information about the award to class counsel for fees and expenses.  
Fees and expenses ranged from $50,000 to $50,000,000, with a mean of $3.4 million and 
a median of $554,000.37  The overall median fee and expense ratio from the pooled data 
was thus about 21% ($554,000 divided by $2.6 million).  This compares to a pooled 
median fee of $2.85 million and median gross recovery of $15.0 million in our sample, as 
shown in Table 3, which yields a pooled ratio of 19%.  The scaling effect, combined with 
our higher median gross recovery, probably helps explain the lower ratio in our sample of 
cases.
33 For a study suggesting possible efforts to discourage aggregate litigation, see Theodore Eisenberg, 
Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Customers But Not for Peers: A Study 
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 Judicature 118 (Nov.-Dec. 2008); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, U. Mich J. L. Reform 871 (2008), 
reprinted in 4 ICFAI University J. of Alternative Dispute Resolution 51 (2008). 
34 Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen J. Carroll, Ingo Vogelsang, and Laura Zakaras, Insurance Class Actions in the 
United States 9-10 (2007). 
35 Id. at 47 (tbl. 3.16). 
36 Id. at 54. 
37 Id. at 55. 
32
Aside from the RAND study’s similar findings about fee levels, the study shows 
the small fraction of class action filings that lead to information about fees, even in the 
absence of being limited to available opinions.  In the RAND data, 564 purported class 
actions led to 78 certified classes and 32 cases with available fee information.  Thus, less 
than 15% of purported class action were certified and about 6% led to useable fee 
information.  If the same proportions are assumed to apply more broadly, then our 689 
fee cases can be thought of as representing over 12,000 purported class action filings.
Federal-State Differences. Despite claims that CAFA was needed to redress 
differences in state and federal court processing of class actions, our data provide little 
evidence of federal-state differences.  The fee per amount recovered did not 
systematically differ between federal and state courts, as shown in Table 17.  And Table 
13 shows that state courts were, if anything, less likely than federal courts to grant the 
requested fee amount.   
The absence of pro-class bias in state courts is consistent with sources cited 
above38 and with additional research.  In the RAND insurance study, of 564 attempted 
class actions, 12% led to a class settlement, with 12% of the 465 state court cases and 
15% of the 98 federal court cases settling.39  The modal outcome of a pretrial ruling for 
the defense did not significantly difference between federal and state courts.40  And the 
settlement rate for the cases with certified classes did not statistically significantly differ 
between federal and state courts.41
Thus, available evidence about comparative state/federal judicial performance in 
class actions consistently suggests no strong differences.
VIII. Conclusion
 Over the course of 16 years, attorney fees in class action cases have displayed a 
strikingly strong linear relation to class recoveries.  Significant associations also exist 
between the fee amount and both the fee method and the riskiness of the case.  Despite 
CAFA’s premise of differences between federal and state court treatment of class actions, 
our findings add to a growing body of evidence that little hard data support claims of 
significant state-federal differences.  Core results persisted in mega cases, those with 
recoveries of $100 million or more, in cases with settlement classes, and in cases with 
and without objectors and opt-outs.  Fees and costs decline as a percent of the recovery as 
the recovery amount increases, suggesting the efficiency of this form of aggregate 
litigation.  In this data set that likely includes the most significant class action opinions, 
those that lead to an available opinion, neither fees nor recoveries materially increased 
over time.   
38 Text accompanying notes 18-22 supra. 
39 Pace et al., supra note 34, at 47 (tbl. 3.16). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 48 (tbl. 3.17).  The study did not distinguish between orders certifying the case for a class trial, 
those certifying for settlement purposes only, and those certifying on a provisional basis only.  Id. at 17. 
Neil Marchand reports that plaintiffs’ preferences for state or federal court in Michigan class actions vary 
depending on the governing substantive law, with preference for state courts in cases governed by state 
substantive law and preference for federal courts in cases governed by federal substantive law.  Neil J. 
Marchand, Class Action Activity in Michigan’s State and Federal Courts, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334923. 
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We hope that the information contained in this study can be of use to courts 
charged with the important, and sometimes daunting, task of setting counsel fees in class 
action and derivative cases. 
